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Abstract
The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM
safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional
safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely
demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments
based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision,
then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What
are the design implications for the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’
(NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM
accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-
to-date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better
system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than
voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system
terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it
more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational
concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real
operational and organisational practices?
1. Introduction
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is the part of the aviation system that is most likely to be
developed through new paradigms. This is a definition of ATM from an ICAO –
International Civil Aviation Organization – document.
“Air Traffic Management is the dynamic and integrated management of air traffic and
airspace, safely, economically and efficiently, through the provision of facilities and
seamless services, in collaboration with all partners.”
Note the emphasis on partners: airlines and airport operators play a big role. The
following list shows some of the features of ATM. .
 Safety
 Air Traffic Control – ATC
 Airspace design & routes
 Technology
Most of the following deals with commercial, passenger and freight carrying, aviation in
developed countries.
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The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk.
ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to
additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance,
are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to
make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks
cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth
and operational/technical changes? What are the implications for proving that new ATM
systems designs are ‘safe’?
The text is divided into a number of sections; the abbreviations are explained later:
2 Technical Background
3 Decision-making on Safety Improvements
4 ATM Safety – Systems Theory
5 Tightly-coupled Sub-systems: Separation Minima
6 Loosely-coupled Sub-systems: STCA and TCAS Decisions
7 Future ATM Systems
8 New Paradigms
9 Safety of New ATM Paradigms
10 Rational – but Sick – Decision Processes
11 How to do Safety Assessment for New Paradigms?
12 Key Safety Assessment and Management Messages
The first two thirds of these Sections use aviation material to draw out general and
interesting lessons, eg about decision-making, data, risk models, as well as lessons for
aviation itself. In the final third, the focus is more specifically on new ATM paradigms –
which are known as Nextgen and SESAR.
2. Technical Background
Where are we now? The present ATM system has evolved over the last 80 years or so.
Over the same period, aviation safety culture has changed, because society’s safety
culture generally has changed dramatically.
During the 1920s and 1930s there were technical and organisational changes that
improved operating efficiency and safety. Radio telephony began to be used. There
was ‘Wireless Traffic Control’ by ‘control officers’. The airspace around the major
aerodromes started to have restrictions placed upon its use (‘control zones’).
The Second World War led to huge changes in aviation: many of them fed into civil use.
The present ATM system has several distinct components in its operational concepts
and technology infrastructure – Figure 1. Air traffic controllers are important decision-
makers. They communicate through radiotelephony; they use flight plans agreed with
pilots; they monitor highly processed secondary surveillance radar – SSR – data.
These data flows are embedded in ‘safety structures’, eg with well-defined controlled
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airspace and formal rules for control such as the minimum separation permitted
between aircraft.
Navigation has developed enormously from the wartime systems. The system has
moved from point source beacons to satellite-based aids, mainly GPS, which are
incredibly accurate. In the UK, there are ground-based short-term conflict alert – STCA
– systems available to warn controllers of aircraft coming into close proximity.
Commercial aircraft now carry a Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System – TCAS –
which actually tell pilots what to do to avoid another aircraft that has lost separation.
The crucial change, in terms of both its current benefits and potential for system
development, is SSR. The controller sees displayed aircraft symbols, callsign and
height information, which have been passed down from aircraft transponders. This
innovation was a huge step, because it meant that operational information could be
passed from the aircraft to the ground system. It is a huge potential step for the future
because the aircraft effectively has the equivalent of a telephone number, and
information can be sent from air to ground and vice versa. In the technical jargon, this
is ‘datalink’– but it is basically text-messaging between all the active aviation parties.
What safety performance does aviation deliver? There are plenty of statistics one can
examine. Figure 2 shows worldwide fatalities for people travelling in airlines over the
last sixty years. It does not include the effects of terrorism or the deaths of third parties
on the ground. The long-term trend of total fatalities is slowly downwards; over the last
twenty years it has averaged about 1100 a year. Over the sixty years, air travel has
expanded dramatically, typically doubling every decade. Mid-air collisions are a small
fraction of the total.
Using figures for Great Britain, the 1995–2004 average rates of fatality per billion
passenger kilometres, across the passenger carrying modes, shows that air has a good
relative historical record – Table 1 – compared to the other modes.
3. Decision-making on Safety Improvements
But what has produced the progressive improvements in safety? And can the system
go on improving safely? These are actually two very different questions. The first is
answered by examining a variety of important safety changes as they actually
happened. But before that, it is necessary to cover some aspects of ATM safety
decision-making and the systems theory underpinning ATM safety. It is important to
keep asking three questions about safety decision-making.
First, what motivates the need to make decisions? Why is there a need for the people
in charge to make a decision? Why did they decide that ‘Do nothing’ was not the best
option?
Second, what are the analytical/political decision processes that are followed? What
data has to be gathered? What quantitative assessments have to be constructed?
What comparisons have to be made? What are the actual decisions? Who has to be
convinced? If there is a ‘Go’ or ‘No Go’ choice, is ‘Further work’ an option? Figure 3
illustrates a possible decision process, simplifying to four phases: Analyse, Debate,
Decide, and Implement.
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Third, what are the resource implications? What are the constraints? Who has to be
persuaded or instructed to spend money on new equipment/training?
Many safety-related decisions are not in fact ‘big decisions’. The system performs well
because of the sum of all the ‘small’ engineering and operational decisions made by
aviation professionals. People want to make things safer. Professionals learn from
mistakes – the UK aviation industry is generally very good at keeping data on
hazardous incidents. Thus safety, as well as effectiveness, improves over time by what
might be called ‘Good Systems Engineering’. This includes elements such as:
rigorous planning of procedures for design inspection and review
quality assurance based on a wide range of targeted tests
continuous evolution by adaptation of products already in widespread use
deliberate over-engineering
This particular set of good practices actually comes from a famous paper ‘How did
Software get so Reliable without Proof?’ (Hoare, 1996) about software development.
Thirty years ago, quite a lot of people believed that aviation would suffer very badly from
computer hardware and software failures – but it has not happened in aviation or other
industries to the extent they feared (but see CSTB, 2007). Could future ATM systems
be more susceptible to such problems?
4. ATM Safety – Systems Theory
Quantitative Safety models can produce useful results if:
There are known types of regularities in sub-system failures/error modes/faults
etc
One can find data to estimate the frequency of these regularities with some
precision
BUT it is not possible to validate or test models completely
BUT a model based on current knowledge produces – at best – approximate
safety estimates for a postulated future ATM system
This leads on to the systems theory underpinning ATM safety. A useful way of thinking
about potential ATM accidents is to construct two broad categories according to the kind
of technological and human system structures that are being employed to ensure
safety. These are called tightly- and loosely-coupled. These terms originated with
Weick (1976), and were subsequently used by Perrow (1984) to analyse accidents.
Perrow in fact defined two important dimensions: interactive complexity and loose/tight
coupling:
Interactive complexity refers to the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and unexpected
sequences of events in a system, either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.
A tightly-coupled system is highly interdependent, with each part of the system being
tightly linked to many other parts, so a change in one part can rapidly affect the status of
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 5
other parts. So tightly-coupled systems respond quickly to perturbations—but this
response may be disastrous.
Loosely-coupled systems have less tight or fewer links between their parts, so they are
able to absorb failures or unplanned behaviour without destabilization
A tightly-coupled design generally uses traditional engineering methods, with bits of
electronic kit, aircraft construction, software, etc. Tightly-coupled systems can survive
failures, but only if that kind of failure has been anticipated and provided for in the
original design. Designers of tightly-coupled systems must therefore invest effort and
thought into anticipating failure modes and providing safety features to permit survival
and recovery. In contrast, loosely-coupled systems tend to accommodate failures
through adaptive responses.
A loosely-coupled system allows some ‘play’ in the system stabilizing (negative)
feedback loops—a little over-correction, followed by some under-correction. Loose
systems are more adaptable, have more tolerance for error, but can have much longer
reaction times. If what happens in one part has little impact on another part, or if
everything happens slowly, eg on the scale of human thinking times, the system is not
tightly-coupled. Loosely-coupled systems tend to be open and continually interacting
with the outside environment.
It would be dangerous to construct a safety-critical system with both interactive
complexity and tight coupling. In such systems, an apparently trivial incident can
potentially cascade in unpredictable ways that cannot be remedied, and hence produce
severe consequences. But ATM does not fall into this category (eg Marais et al, 2004).
In general, much of ATM system design is deliberately de-coupled in order to increase
safety. Thus, large minimum separations are required between aircraft, so that
mistakes by pilots or controllers can be remedied; hence loosely-coupled. This is in a
system containing independent and engineering-redundant safety defensive layers.
It must also be noted that system safety performance necessarily depends on
organisational safety performance. Sorensen (2002) notes:
“There is a widespread belief that safety culture is an important contributor to safe
operations…The commonly accepted attributes of safety culture include good
organizational communications, good organizational learning, and senior management
commitment to safety. Safety culture may be particularly important in reducing latent
errors in complex, well-defended systems.”
Safety culture aspects are seen as increasingly important for European ATM, eg
Eurocontrol (2006).
Some sub-systems of the ATM System are designed to be tightly-coupled. The key
element is that the range of expressed ‘failure modes’ is comparatively limited and well
defined. Thus, the sub-system acts in a ‘programmable’ or routine fashion (with specific
designated functions). These kinds of approximately tightly-coupled systems would
include navigation of well-defined route systems, altimetry and instrument landing
systems. In such cases, Human Factors ‘failures’ can be sufficiently regular in nature to
permit a simple accident model to be used. For example, it may be possible to measure
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the frequency of a straightforward error in inputting flight level or North Atlantic track
data into an aircraft computer. The operation of these kinds of tightly-coupled designs
can therefore usually be modelled quantitatively.
In contrast, loosely-coupled ATM sub-systems would include the pilot flying the aircraft
away from airport runways and ATC/pilot interactions in sectors. Loosely-coupled ATM
designs use much more complex information sources. For example, the controller’s job
requires visualization and situational awareness skills.
The ATM system’s safety defensive layers combine a variety of tightly-coupled and
loosely-coupled sub-systems – Figure 4. Together, they act systematically to reduce
mid-air collision risk. The purpose of the system layers is to reduce the ‘end product
risk’. Thus, each defensive layer should scale down the probability of a potentially
hazardous situation. This leads to two kinds of qualitative/quantitative safety model:
Tightly-coupled models — Accident risk is a function of specific failures, e.g.,
gross navigational errors or a restricted set of Human Factor failures occurring
comparatively regularly. Risk can be numerically quantified in terms of a limited
number of key failure modes using collision risk models.
Loosely-coupled models — Safety is provided through a structure of defensive
layers: risks occur if these layers perform poorly and do not filter out potentially
hazardous situations. In some circumstances, risk can be roughly numerically
quantified, based on past defensive layer performance.
‘Collision risk model’ – CRM – here means analytical frameworks on which are ‘hung’
empirical and statistical data about rates at which errors occur, recovery mechanisms,
and failure probabilities. The earliest models were constructed to deal with aircraft
simply relying on accurate navigation to avoid other aircraft. The collision risk could be
estimated as the product of the frequency of a gross navigational error, ie bringing the
aircraft across another flightpath, and the probability that this crossing aircraft would
then pass very close to the aircraft on that flightpath (Reich, 1966).
5. Tightly-coupled Sub-systems: Separation Minima
It is easy to list some successful (tightly-coupled) CRMs (details of the references are
given in Brooker (2006a)):
Navigation beacon defined routes
Longitudinal North Atlantic separation
North Atlantic Track System
Radar separation
Precision Runway Monitor
Vertical separation
Area navigation parallel routes
These models are effective because they involve changing one or two sub-system
parameters, and using probabilities of gross error events; they do not usually involve
major changes to controller or pilot tasks.
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 7
The result of these studies is that various separation standards – separation minima is
the formal phrase – were reduced. A very important recent example – implemented
several years after the risk sums were done – was in fact the reduction in the vertical
separation standard from 2000 feet to 1000 feet for aircraft flying above 29,000 feet. In
most cases, the change examined is of a single operational parameter.
But why were these separation minima reduced? What was the motivation for this?
The main motivation is to deliver operational benefits from investment in improved
equipment. Better navigational kit on the aircraft or new radars on the ground enable
the elimination of some of the ‘deliberate over-engineering’ referred to earlier. Thus, the
aim is to introduce new technologies and ways of operating in what can reasonably be
justified as safe system improvements. This is very different from the situation where
new technology is introduced simply to achieve some safety benefit. These ‘safety
benefit cases’ do exist in ATM: the obvious examples are STCA and TCAS, which are
examined later.
So what would be safe system improvements? Figure 5 shows the key arguments.
The first question asks about the acceptable risk in order to derive the Safety Target –
the abbreviation TLS, target level of safety’, is often used. The two components are the
way that risk is to be measured and a value judgement about acceptability. But
somewhere in the process there has to be a value judgement about accidents and
deaths, eg about the rate of safety improvement. The second question asks about the
actual risk that would follow a change. To quantify the future risk level, it is first
necessary to develop a sufficiently comprehensive model of the processes and factors
that contribute to this risk level. The key mechanisms that generate risk consequences
need to be established. The significant causal factors and the associated risk
probabilities must all be examined, albeit that not all can be quantified.
The model then has to be used to predict risks. Data on the risk mechanisms –
equipment failure, human beings' failure rates – needs to be input into the model.
These sorts of data may sometimes be immediately available, more often measurement
exercises will be needed, but it may well be difficult or impossible to collect all the kinds
of data to establish adequate statistical confidence.
The third component is validation. Is the model OK? Is the data input OK? How can its
accuracy be tested? These can be exceedingly difficult tasks. Much of the problem is
with the extremely tight targets that are now placed on aviation safety.
Validation is inherently a major problem. Historically – 40 or 50 years ago – the focus
was on equipment failure modes, so that low risk rates could be achieved through
equipment redundancy and monitoring. Today – and presumably in the future too – the
focus is much more on abnormal events, in which human factors can play a major part.
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Returning to the first part of Figure 5, establishing Safety Targets requires some
quantitative measure of risk. For ATM, the metric used in the UK has been ‘fatal aircraft
accidents per 107 aircraft flying hours’. The choice of the number of aircraft accidents
rather than the number of deaths was made because ATC handles aircraft rather than
individual passengers. (A constant safety rate would correspond to an increasing
number of people killed each year.) A fatal accident is one in which at least one person
in the aircraft is killed. Aircraft flying hours matches ‘exposure’ to the ATC service,
which is provided over the duration of the flight.
The next step is to determine the safety target to be used in system design, against
which prediction of the effects of system changes can be compared. The method
chosen is to extrapolate safety performance – which historically has improved over time
– to some ‘design year’ in the future. Figure 6 illustrates the method – the statistically
fitted trend line is of negative exponential or similar form (although tending to flatten out
for recent years). Boeing Commercial Airplane (2007) shows both the flatness of the
statistical trends and how tight the collision risk targets need to be. For example, over
the last decade there were 89 fatal accidents to commercial jets, of which two were mid-
air collisions.
The trend line method essentially maintains current overall trends towards safety
performance. It must be stressed that the target is based on a progressive
improvement on achieved performance rather than some ‘absolute’ figure.
The next step is to move from aircraft accidents in general to targets for mid-air
collisions. This process is ‘risk budgeting’ – essentially the setting of minimum design
targets for the contributory types of accident (eg see Brooker (2004b) for more detail
and references). The risk budget philosophy attempts to break down accident risk into
sub-categories. Each sub category has its own risk budget, which can then if required
be broken down into further sub- sub categories. The risk rate is measured in terms of
accidents per exposure measure.
A top-level version of this is Figure 7. Here the subcomponents are the phases of flight
for an aircraft: takeoff, en-route and landing, with exposure being measured by flying
hours.
One more detailed breakdown is that for en-route separation minima, shown in Figure 8.
The rate will be for fatal aircraft accidents (passenger fatalities in both aircraft producing
two fatal aircraft accidents).
It is important to note the nature of the ‘Other…’ box at the bottom of Figure 8. This
covers such risks as errors in coordination between the aircraft crew and ATC, leading
to an aircraft occupying a flight level other than that intended by ATC, or errors in ATC
instructions leading to a similar consequence. The complementary ‘Loss…’ box relates
to inaccuracies in height keeping, which leads to an erosion of the vertical separation
minimum.
The boxes do not describe ‘causal factors/events’ – did a particular piece of equipment
fail, did a pilot mishear a controller, did the navigation system being used fail to provide
accurate information, etc, although these kinds of events will occur ‘in’ the boxes.
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An example of a safety target is the ICAO figure of ‘1.5 x 10 - 8 fatal aircraft accidents
per flying hour’ as the rate corresponding to mid-air collisions – for any reason and in
any spatial dimension – in en route flight in controlled airspace. This is a target for total
system design to an assured level of safety, ie all (sic) types of failure, mechanical,
procedural and human, which generate a risk of collision will be accounted for.
6. Loosely-coupled Sub-systems: STCA and TCAS Decisions
So tightly-coupled sub-systems can potentially be modelled with some confidence, if
certain conditions (mainly regarding data) are met, ie accident rates can be expressed
in terms of sub-system failure rates. But what about loosely-coupled parts of the total
system? The system relies on safety defences in depth—a multiplicity of formal,
technical and human safety defensive layers—to deliver the necessary safety. But they
cannot usually be modelled quantitatively with great precision. So the safety target and
modelling arguments will not work: the problem is that it is not possible to estimate the
safety consequences of loosely-coupled elements with precision (Brooker, 2006a).
There are just too many options, too large a potential for adaptive response and
flexibility, too many probabilities to estimate, and not enough ‘accurate’ data available.
It is actually easy to do the sums by standard hazard analysis techniques, but the
problem then is assessing how good the sums are; what kind of precision can be
attached to risk estimates?
Simply making lots of ‘cautious’ assumptions generally tends to produce over-
pessimistic risk estimates, and hence is of little value for safety decision-makers. Does
‘expert judgement’ solve the problem? To quote Moray (1990) (in response to
Dougherty (1990)):
“The use of ‘expert judgement’ is a polite name for ‘expert guesses’, and we do
not have data to validate the accuracy of the guesses.”
Safety for loosely-coupled operational sub-systems is improved – purportedly ‘‘to meet
safety targets’’ – by an on-going process of safety feedback plus the introduction of
additional safety-related defensive layers and engineering redundancies, eg STCA,
TCAS, error-free aircraft Flight Management System databases, etc. The key thing to
ensure safety is that the ATM safety layers work effectively enough together to produce
the necessary corrective action. For example, there is a need to focus attention on
circumstances and geometries when STCA and TCAS do not provide large amounts of
extra protection or when the geometries/velocities mean that they induce risk.
But how did anyone decide to introduce loosely-coupled operational sub-systems like
STCA and TCAS? Different countries have different decision processes – the following
is the UK experience.
First, STCA in the UK: in the UK’s National Air Traffic Services (NATS) version of
STCA, a computer system continually monitors secondary surveillance radar (SSR)
data and alerts air traffic controllers if it detects a situation where two aircraft are in
danger of approaching too close to one other. STCA is concerned with potential
conflicts in projected flight paths (Figure 9 – the overlapping discs for cautiously
projected flightpaths). The goal is to provide a warning – with special symbols on the
controller’s radar display – around 90 to 120 seconds before the Closest Point of
Approach (CPA) of the two aircraft. This gives them time to redirect the aircraft if they
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judge it necessary. STCA alerts do not imply specific mandatory action by the
controller. He or she is presented with the extra information as part of the normal AC
task.
The algorithms in the STCA computer software are specifically tailored for the varieties
of airspace and separation rules. The STCA software contains a large number of
parameters, whose values have to be fixed by extensive safety testing.
STCA does not ‘know’ the intentions of the pilots or air traffic controllers who may be
aware of a potential conflict and already be taking measures to avoid it. As STCA must
make cautious predictions, there are necessarily nuisance alerts as well as genuine
alerts. There is a trade-off between genuine and nuisance alerts: if the software
eliminated all the nuisance alerts, then it would also fail to identify many genuine alerts.
But if there were too many nuisance alerts, it would be difficult to maintain the
controllers’ confidence in STCA. The right balance has to be struck.
So was STCA introduced through some rational process involving safety targets and
benefits? No, it was not. Twenty years ago, there were some serious incidents
involving aircraft coming too close together, at much less than the separation minimum.
These incidents were known then as Airmisses, now as Airproxes. One involved a
blunder by a controller sequencing traffic from two of the holding stacks north of
Heathrow: the aircraft flew towards each other.
The Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the head of NATS had a
conversation about the Airprox. It went on the lines:
"Controllers sometimes make these very bad blunders. What’s stopping a mid-
air collision?"
"ATC Supervisor plus chance."
"That’s a guarantee?"
"No."
"There must be something else."
"We could try implementing the STCA in the ATC computers."
"You do that - and soon."
The NATS STCA system became operational for parts of UK en route airspace in 1988.
An essential ingredient for its introduction was the bringing on stream of a new
generation of secondary surveillance radars with much better accuracy and
performance. There had been some in-house research going on into STCA, but it had
not been top-priority for implementation until the Chairman had made his views very
clear. The research, development and implementation costs included the optimisation
of the software (eg re nuisance alerts), design of screen displays and interfaces,
production of training packages, and individual STCA training briefings and simulations
for several hundred controllers.
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TCAS actually works on very similar principles to STCA. TCAS is an aircraft system
using SSR transponder signals to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting
aircraft that are also equipped with SSR transponders. It operates independently of
ground-based equipment. TCAS produces Traffic Alerts (TAs) and vertical Resolution
Advisories (RA): Figure 10 shows TAs in yellow and RAs in red.
Based on the horizontal and vertical closing rates, TCAS calculates dynamic protective
volumes around its aircraft. If the closing intruder is assessed as a threat, then a TCAS
system proposes an RA to the pilot as a Vertical Avoidance Manoeuvre. The system
can coordinate its RA with the intruder aircraft, if it can generate an RA, so that the
manoeuvres are complementary. Corrective RAs require the pilot to change the
flightpath of the aircraft; preventive RAs require the pilot to keep the aircraft on that
flightpath. TCAS’s RAs are generated much nearer to the predicted CPA – Closest
Point of Approach – than are STCA alerts. Typical threshold times are between 15 and
35 seconds before predicted CPA, ie they are much closer to the CPA than STCA alerts
to controllers.
So was TCAS introduced through some rational process involving safety targets and
benefits? No, it was not. It followed a political decision by the USA. One of the main
causes was the Cerritos, California, mid-air collision in 1986. An Aeromexico DC-9 with
64 passengers collided with a private Cessna aircraft carrying a family of three. The
DC-9 crashed into a neighborhood and destroyed18 homes and killed 15 people on the
ground. MIT (2007) provides some history of mid-air collisions in the USA. It comments
that “mid-air collisions have the effect of raising public awareness and causing a great
deal of interest and pressure from the press and the public to ‘do something’. Early
versions of TCAS had in fact been under development for at least a decade before the
Cerritos accident (Williamson and Spencer, 1989).
In December 1987, the Congress of the USA enacted Public Law 100-223, which
‘requires the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to complete the
development of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) and ensure
that it is installed on all airplanes with more than 30 passenger seats by December
1991’. Thus, TCAS has been mandatory in USA airspace since 1991. It became
mandatory in Europe in 2000, and there has been an ICAO world-wide mandate
operating from 2003. ICAO concluded that the use of TCAS would reduce markedly the
risk of collision. ICAO recognised that TCAS is not a panacea: it cannot resolve all
possible collisions; it may increase some risks of collision.
It took quite a long time to move from the initial USA Public Law to world-wide
introduction. Airlines were in fact buying TCAS kit well before it was mandated. Was
there some kind of safety cost benefit analysis? There were some attempts to do this,
but the focus on what is termed the ‘Risk Ratio’:
Risk Ratio: the net improvement in safety arising from TCAS implementation. If
the probability of a Near Mid-Air Collision is P(NMAC), then the ratio of P(NMAC)
when TCAS is used to P(NMAC) without TCAS is the Risk Ratio. Properly-used
TCAS will successfully resolve most potential mid-air collisions, but some will not
be resolved; and an additional fraction will be ‘induced’ (as some non-critical
encounters are converted into critical ones).
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Carpenter (2004) is a good source for the history of this work. Risk Ratios depend on
the kinds of conflicts that occur. As there are very few mid-air collisions, potential future
conflicts have to be estimated by simulating realistic aircraft encounters. These
conflicts use real traffic events and then vary their parameters realistically, eg seeing
the effects of putting aircraft closer to each other when some manoeuvre occurs. The
key point is that the Risk Ratio is essentially an experimental measurement of projected
performance, not a simple output from purely mathematical calculations or computer
science. The development work through States and ICAO over the decades has
focused on improving the Risk Ratio and reducing the induced risks.
Interestingly, the final stages of the USA TCAS mandate did involve cost/benefit
considerations of the kind envisaged by Evans (2005). The final mandate (FAA, 2003)
was specified in terms of airplane weight and performance characteristics, and had the
consequence of covering larger cargo aircraft. [NB: TCAS installation costs of the order
of €200,000 per aircraft and the aircraft operator incurs significant ongoing maintenance
costs.] The justification for the inclusion of cargo aircraft included a safety cost benefit
analysis that estimated the frequency of different kinds of mid-air collision, the costs of
installation, the costs of lost aircraft, plus a valuation of ‘avoided deaths’. To quote: “…it
is assumed that a midair collision will result in fatalities for all passengers and crew,
rather than some percentage attributed to various classifications of injuries. The value
per averted fatality is estimated to be $3.0 million.” (This figure is taken from USA
Department of Transportation recommendations.) Thus, while the initial TCAS policy
decision was political, the final details incorporated formal risk analyses and safety
costings: the weighing of costs and benefits did affect the installation decision for cargo
aircraft.
7. Future ATM Systems
The introduction of TCAS was essentially the last safety layer in the current ATM
system. The system is expected to continue evolving in future years, with safety
lessons being learnt and engineering systems being improved. So why are ‘new
paradigms’ being suggested? What indeed is meant by a new paradigm? Paradigm
was used originally in the History of Science to refer to a theoretical framework.
Researchers in many different fields now often see themselves as developing new
paradigms. Paradigm is a buzzword or a key concept, depending on one’s attitude to
adapted words (paradigm actually derives from a Greek word meaning ‘to compare’).
For ATM systems, the main current safety paradigm – the prevailing view of things – is
that it is the air traffic controller’s task to prevent mid-air collisions. A new paradigm
would move substantial parts of this control workload to either or both aircrew and
computer assistance, usually requiring a considerable enhancement of the data
available for decision-making. Why move the workload? The need to do this reflects
peoples’ views that the present controller-based paradigm is in one or several ways
‘reaching its limits’, so its continued evolution will not solve future problems effectively.
If you are going to make changes, it is vital to develop a clear picture of the intended
end-product. How to establish the characteristics of that picture is the problem.
Answering technical questions is important in getting to that picture – but it is vital to try
to work out what really are the full range of questions that need to be answered. It is
essential to frame the ‘Key Tests’ that will enable the full picture of the future ATM
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system to be established. In analysing a potential major system change, it is important
to try to break down the problems to be resolved into several distinct types of issue. A
simple formal division into five key test areas, not in any particular order of importance,
is:
Safety Credibility
Technological Feasibility
Operational Concept
Benefits and Costs
Transition Path
The focus is on some aspects of just three of these: Safety Credibility, Operational
Concept, and Transition Path.
Safety is always the top priority in the introduction of new aviation systems. Key
questions would be:
What sorts of quantitative tests would be needed to prove that a new system is
sufficiently safe?
What safety management performance is necessary before the safety regulator
would be convinced?
Does the new system pass the safety regulator’s tests?
Even ‘simple’ sub-system changes, from a whole system point of view, require
extensive data collection and analysis before they can be accepted. This would be a
much harder job with linked and integrated communications, navigation and surveillance
systems. Automation routes require, as a foundation, a complete logical structure for
ATC decision-making – against all eventualities. Then the hardware and the software
design would have to be demonstrated as providing the necessary reliability and safety
critical integrity.
The phrase Operational Concept means no more than a clear picture of how the future
system would operate:
Who uses what information to do what things?
What are the responsibilities, and on whom do they rest?
How are decisions made?
The present operational concept has evolved over the decades. In safety terms, it is
sequentially ‘overlaid’ on to the immediately previous concept, rather than being a clean
sheet redesign. Many in commercial aviation believe that the current system is too
rigid, with flights not always being able to use preferred routeings and profiles (often
termed ‘free routeing’).
There has to be a realistic transition path from the present system! Does the transition
path make sense in both safety and business terms? Transition risks at old/new
airspace boundaries? Formal processes involved in international development, testing
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and certification are lengthy – TCAS and major separation minima changes took 10-15
years to reach substantial operational implementation
At the heart of the present Operational Concept are the controller and the work that has
to be done in handling aircraft. Control workload is a multi-dimensional concept
encompassing both the difficulty of tasks and the effort – physical and mental – that has
to be brought to bear, plus a personal dimension – Figure 11. The aim is not to make
theoretically "optimal" decisions but rather to prevent bad decisions from ever being
made. The controller has to act in real time, so the systems designers have to make
sure there is as much of this available to the controller as is necessary for the critical
tasks.
One crucial question is always the extent to which a system improvement changes the
air traffic controller’s tasks. Airspace capacity is in many instances – very much so in
Europe – the leading constraint on traffic throughput. This capacity is largely
determined by the acceptable workload on sector controllers. To gain capacity in a
block of airspace, the controller tasks have to be made ‘easier’ – by computer
assistance – or some tasks have to be eliminated – Figure 12. These eliminated tasks
could be automated or transferred to the flight deck, ie to the pilot. In a complementary
fashion, to prevent the pilot from being over-burdened, aircrew tasks need to be
eliminated or cut down. Hence, some pilot voice communication would be replaced by
electronic data communication. But tasks added to the flight deck need to have all the
on-board systems to perform them safely.
Controller and pilot errors are by far the main ‘causes’ of hazardous ATM incidents,
which are the precursors of accidents. A vital tool in learning about ATC safety is data
from Airproxes. An Airprox is formally defined as ‘a situation in which, in the opinion of
a pilot or a controller, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and
speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved was or may have been
compromised’.
Figure 13 shows some statistics – unofficial – from recent UK Airprox Board (UKAB)
Reports. The aim was to find any with ‘root causes’ beyond immediate human
error/misjudgement etc. Thus, the Airspace category focuses on incidents with airspace
design and/or operational procedures that raise questions about ways of de-conflicting
traffic features. If these issues could be satisfactorily dealt with, then this would prevent
reoccurrences of this kind of Airprox in the particular locality. ‘Incorrect readback’
means that the pilot incorrectly read back ATC instructions and this was undetected by
the controller. The three ‘Technical’ incidents are those where equipment was involved.
They were consequences of sudden cabin decompression, the misreading of a
navigational chart, and the failure of flightdeck procedures to detect an incorrect setting
on the flight computer.
What are the lessons from actual ATM accidents? Figure 14 sketches a very recent
one, the mid-air collision tragedy that happened five years ago at Überlingen on the
Swiss-German border. Here is a selection of human-related elements, but there were
several technical problems too, with STCA not functioning properly and the telephone
network used by the controller completely out of order. There are safety regulation
issues. From the accident report, it appears that the controller tried extremely hard to
get everything sorted out – but he failed. The situation that he had been placed in just
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did not give him much of a chance to resolve things. He was murdered by a relative of
several of the passengers. In September 2007, four managers of the Swiss ATC firm
were found guilty of manslaughter.
So, for a markedly different ATM system to deliver safety, the entire system (people,
equipment, procedures) has to be designed to help prevent human error and capture
the inevitable errors before they result in a collision. To quote Kim Cardosi: “People
make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, and well-
intentioned people make mistakes.” In the 2007 Wimbledon Final, Roger Federer
Double-faulted or made an Unforced Error roughly every six minutes. The average
USA physician kills two people by accident during his/her career (Dekker, 2006). Some
examples of controller and pilot mistakes, from Airprox Data, are:
“Controller did not monitor aircraft 1’s progress – he was bandboxing and had
been concentrating on traffic situation elsewhere.
ATC occupied with other traffic, did not spot high descent rate.
Controller gave ‘erroneously and essentially unforced descent instruction’ to
aircraft 2.
The aircraft 2 crew read back the wrong heading and level instructions, which
went undetected by the controller.”
Future systems designs have to prevent these kinds of errors happen or deal with them
safely.
Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system terms as the
Überlingen mid-air collision. ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller
workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-to-date information. Can these accident
precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM
participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication?
8. New Paradigms
So what is being proposed? SESAR is Europe’s ‘Single European Sky Air traffic
Research system’. NextGen is the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transport System’
[previously known as NGATS]. SESAR and NextGen are developments targeted at
post 2020. Neither of them is fully developed, so their current descriptions still include
different options for achieving safe and cost-effective systems. In particular, the degree
to which control tasks are transferred to the aircraft/aircrew and to ground automation
(and the transitional steps involved) are questions that will need to be definitively
answered.
The common SESAR and NextGen vision is to integrate and implement new
technologies to improve air traffic management (ATM) performance – a ‘new paradigm’.
SESAR and NextGen combine increased automation with new procedures to achieve
safety, economic, capacity, environmental, and security benefits. The technical
systems do not have to be identical, but must have aligned requirements for equipment
standards and technical interoperability.
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Figure 15 shows a very simplified picture of NextGen. It creates a ‘cooperative
surveillance’ model for civil aircraft operations, where aircraft are constantly transmitting
their position, flight path intent, and other useful aircraft parameters (ADS-B – Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast). Both expect aircraft position to be determined
using a satellite navigation constellation, such as GPS or Galileo.
The operating concept for NextGen is summarized in Figure 16. The basis for planning
and executing system operations is an aircraft 4D trajectory, which is the aircraft path,
three space dimensions plus time, from gate-to-gate, including the path along the
ground at the airport. Data on the planned and actual trajectories are exchanged
between air and ground. Digital satellite communication constellations report positions
to ground facilities. All other communication is through this constellation as well. So,
gate-to-gate 4-D trajectories are broadcast and, if necessary, so are voice
communications. Thus, Communications, Navigation and Surveillance functions are
much less ground-based than the current system.
Figure 17 is summarised from an early 2007 description of SESAR concepts (EC,
2007). Very recently, the SESAR Consortium has issued its 162-page ATM Target
Concept (SESAR Consortium, 2007), which inter alia shows the complexity of the
concept. It notes that:
“The ATM Target Concept is not about one size/one solution fits all; it offers
different concept features which can be tailored to the specific local needs to
meet the local performance objectives and their evolution in the life time of
SESAR.”
SESAR currently appears to be more general than NextGen. The main difference
shown in Figures 14 and 15 is that NextGen additionally uses automation through the
Evaluator function to analyze these trajectories to ensure aircraft remain at safe
distances from one another. The Evaluator uses the extra information and
communication power to enable safe and efficient decisions to be centralised but
system-wide.
Regarding transferring some tasks to pilots (independent autonomous decision-
making), the terms ABS-B and ASAS are widely used. ADS-B is ‘Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast’ and ASAS is ‘Airborne Separation Assistance System’. Some
brief explanations:
ADS-B: aircraft periodically broadcast details of their position, altitude, velocity
and other flight data via a digital data link.
ASAS can transfer the responsibility of maintaining separation between two
aircraft from ground ATC to the airborne side when feasible.
Aircraft transmit their position via a data link.
These data are presented on the traffic display in the cockpit.
ASAS alerts and advises the crew.
Separation maintenance is the responsibility of the cockpit crew.
There are lots of different interpretations and schemes for the use of ASAS, some
tactical, others more strategic. ASAS’s safety depends on retaining large separation
minima (inter alia restricting traffic density), and introducing more sophisticated conflict
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detection algorithms and cockpit displays/automatic warning systems. So they are
inter-related concepts – but basically rely on airborne text messaging.
A key jargon phrase in NextGen and SESAR discussions is ‘Net-centric’: ‘A networked
collection of capabilities that empower end-users to pull the information they require
from any available source, with minimal latency to support the mission at hand’. An
internet-like network carries a common real-time information set. This ‘net-enabled
information’ has to be accessible, usable, and secure for all ATM system decision-
making parties. Information is ‘pushed’ to known users, and available to be ‘pulled’ by
new users. Everything operating in the system is part of NextGen. Aircraft are mobile
‘nodes’ within a larger information network. Aircraft use and provide information, and
are also able to route messages/information sent from another aircraft or ground
source.
Will NextGen and SESAR be implemented in the way that people are currently
envisaging? The investment side of things is a major challenge: even early cost
estimates for the systems are in the tens of billions of Euro/dollars, and stakeholders will
need to be convinced that the benefits outweigh the costs.
9. Safety of New ATM Paradigms
‘Safety Philosophy’ is a very hard problem at the heart of the safety assessment
process for a new paradigm. The final system must be safe, and so must all the
transitional stages. The problems are with the ideas behind designing a safe system
and those of proving it to be safe. If the system safety defences change their nature
considerably, then where will the evidence come from to substantiate claims of a safe
system? Political decisions, eg concerning TCAS, had a great impact on change in the
past, but could politicians really be expected to be the main safety decision-makers on
the acceptability of large-scale ‘new paradigm’ system changes?
This leads to a long list of both generic and specific questions:
 Can a safe ‘new paradigm’ ATM system be designed?
 Can an ATM system be implemented in safe stages?
 Can all the interim and the final ATM systems be proved safe?
o Resilience against extreme events?
o Human Factors?
o Software/Hardware?
o Safety philosophy?
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NextGen has the potential to be very safe. Most current accidents and serious incidents
are caused by a ‘lack of reasonable intent’ rather than equipment failures or software
errors. Reasonable intent essentially means that aircraft are committed to sensible
flightpaths. But sometimes a pilot decides to climb or descend for no strong reason; an
urgent problem may hold the controller’s attention to the detriment of new developing
problems; airport staff can drive on to an active runway they believed was shut etc.
These precursors of accidents arise out of workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-
to-date information. NextGen could potentially eliminate these precursors by the
common knowledge of 4D trajectories, safety checks through the Evaluator, and
machine communication rather than voice messages.
But there are few publications as yet on the safety of NextGen. One very interesting
one is by Andrews et al (2005): it is mainly intended to highlight where further work is
needed. Two issues about extreme technical events they note are:
Aircraft fly 4D trajectories using their Flight Management Systems (FMS). But
sometimes the flightpath will not conform to the specified trajectory, eg because
of engine failure, extreme turbulence, FMS performance limits. This ‘control fault
non-conformance’ is a key fault type. What improvements in FMS performance
will be needed?
Ground computer systems covering large areas may fail or be shut down to
respond to anomalous events (‘outages’). The suggestion is that structured
recovery planning can handle this ‘troubling question’.
NextGen and SESAR must successfully deal with Human Factors issues, but this work
is very much in its early stages. A sample of issues from Sheridan (2006) and Sheridan
et al (2006) is:
 Who (human) or what (computer) has authority at different stages of flight.
 What network information would be ‘pushed’ (mandatory display to human
operators), what would need to be ‘pulled’ (explicitly requested), etc.
 Problems of robustness, reliability and operator trust in computer decision
support tools/control.
 Control instabilities resulting from closed-loop time delays, eg due to ATC time-
sharing of attention.
 Operator error in ‘automation mental modelling’ and situation awareness of what
the automation has done, is doing, or will do.
Software and hardware become much more important in the new paradigm systems,
because they are much more tightly-coupled and safety-critical in decision-making than
the present ATM system. But it is a fantasy to believe that either software or hardware
can be proved ‘correct’ (whatever that may mean – eg see Cohn (1989), MacKenzie
(1991)). Modern thinking (eg Thomas, 2004; McDermid and Kelly, 2006)) warns that
the safety critical software industry ‘falls far short of the standards expected from a
mature industry developing very complex and highly critical systems’, in particular:
“…it is impractical to have sound evidence that a system has achieved a pfh
[probability of dangerous failure per hour [pfh] of 10-5 or lower and that the safety
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assurance of safety-related systems is therefore inevitably a matter of
judgement.
To show that some system met the targets for SIL 1 [Safety Integrity Level 1] ([ie]
10-6 <pfh<10-5) would involve testing the system continuously for more than ten
years, under operational conditions, with no unsafe failures and no modifications
to the system (Littlewood and Strigini, 1993).”
10. Rational – but Sick – Decision Processes
Earlier, Figure 3 illustrated a possible decision process. A good decision process
concludes – there is a ‘Stopping Point’. But real decision processes may not produce
implementation, or may deliver it after a very, very long time indeed.
People sometimes use the phrase ‘Road Map’ to describe the process involved in
getting to a new ATM system. But this analogy is badly flawed. A Road Map exists
only if somebody has explored all the territory thoroughly. A better analogy is an
exploration, in which one starts from somewhere and hopes one has a good idea about
what the goal ought to be, but then one has to explore different kinds of progressively
more and more unfamiliar territory.
Figure 18 illustrates a ‘Rational – but sick’ decision process. The main horizontal chain
of four phases is the same as before, but now the diagram is a great deal messier. The
diagram shows a variety of things that can damage the effectiveness of the process.
Analyse: The evidence to support a decision may be lacking; there may be insufficient
data; the mathematical or simulation models may not be able to cover some possibilities
or have too many unknown parameters.
Debate: The challenge and peer review processes may be ineffective (eg lack of
independent critical analyses) and/or over-effective (eg focus on second-order issues).
Professional inputs, however well intentioned, may produce ‘Process Paralysis’.
Examples of the kinds of things one may not hear very often are:
Mathematical modellers: ‘Pointless trying to produce a complicated model with
lots of Greek symbols and subscripts. We can never get the data to fill in all
those unknown parameters. I’ve got a simple model that gives an approximate
answer.’
Human Factors folk: ‘Oh yes, I agree totally. You’ve covered all the potential HF
error modes. It’s all perfectly safe. Absolutely my last word.’
Computing experts: ‘No problems. We totally understand the requirement
specification – foolproof. Formal methods and testing on your enormous
program will guarantee the software fault density is < 0.01 per KLoC and we’ll
achieve SIL 4.’
The problem is that there are usually very few ways of speeding up the safe changes
but many ways of slowing them down.
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Decide: The key question is whether or not there are clear criteria, preferably ‘Go’ and
‘No Go’ choices. If the aim is to meet some specific criterion or numerical target then
the question is simple: is it met or is it not? If there is not a hurdle, then judgement
comes in – but whose judgement? Do many – even any – of the decision-makers really
follow what has happened in the previous two phases? Can a few participants block a
decision, as in old-fashioned dramas about jury trials? Is the debate ‘academic’ in the
bad sense of the word: nitpicking, asking for more and more information, never getting
to decisions?
Do further work: If the process does not get beyond the Debate or Decision stage, the
usual consequence is asking for further work to be done. That is sensible if the iteration
gets the process to a conclusion. If it does not, then there is the potential for many
iterations back to the Analyse and Debate stages, as shown in Figure 18.
The whole process complexity means that the likelihood of Implementation fades away.
There is never a Stopping Point. How can this be prevented? How can ‘worthwhile’
things be implemented – whilst making sure that ‘non-worthwhile’ things be ruled out?
At least some of the problem is to do with the use of words like worthwhile and non-
worthwhile. Staying solely in the safety context, a worthwhile change is one that at least
ensures present safety levels. But how can the decision-makers be confident that this
has been proved? ‘Proof’ is the key word here.
One complication is that the ‘Who?’ in the Decide box is actually composed of a variety
of people. Even if they all behave rationally and responsibly, they may have very
different ideas about what would actually constitute ‘proof’. It is very unlikely that they
would simply be fed a fait accompli by the Debate box: some of the quantitative outputs
and qualitative assessments, even after long periods of analysis and debate, will be
based on incomplete information.
What dangers could there be? The answer is you get Stasis. This was a word used by
the ancient Greeks to mean many different things: civil war, arguments between
factions, ‘a stoppage’. Today, it generally means a cessation of progress or change. It
would be worse than that, because one consequence would be a great number of
safety and human factors analysts producing increasingly elegant mathematical models
and unverifiable complex calculations – but which do not convince decision-makers
about practical ‘Go/No go’ choices. Thus, the ‘Downside Potential’ is ‘Safety Analysis
Paralysis’: highly intellectual activity with lots of entertaining conferences and seminars,
but no conclusive outputs.
The solution – and it is by no means a painless one – is to get agreement at the outset
of the process on decision-making. It is essential to create ‘Safety Innovation
Strategies’ that deliver workable decision-making processes. If it is possible to agree
early on criteria for proof and good ideas about the means by which such criteria might
be met, then the Analyse and Debate boxes become much more tractable. The same
kinds of problems occur with collective choice decisions in public policy (eg Buchanan,
1986).
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11. How to do Safety Assessment for New Paradigms?
So what would be an appropriate way forward? What would lead in practice to the right
kinds of data collection, modelling, analysis, etc? Three strategic elements for a change
producing each new system phase towards the final ATM system, are suggested, with
some explanations to follow:
Is the estimated safety level of the new ATM system about the same as the
present ATM system?
Does the new ATM system prove resilient in ‘Human-in-the-Loop’ simulations to
a wide variety of incentivised novel system challenges?
If unsafe ‘emergent properties’ and new kinds of HF error are to be
detected/corrected quickly in operation, there needs to be increased emphasis
on automatic detection systems.
Before exploring these further, it is necessary to put some limits on what could be a
‘new system’. It cannot simply be a jump to the final stage of a NextGen or SESAR
development. There are two reasons for this:
The estimated performance characteristics of such an end-product will be very
imprecise until data have been gathered about the sub-system components
performance. Adding the effects of a large number of imprecise estimates
produces a very imprecise estimate of the final system performance.
Emergent properties mean that it will not be possible to understand all the failure
modes of the final system merely from characteristics of the present system plus
software/HF modelling.
The first of these is the problem at the heart of general Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) methods when used to analyse ATM systems (Brooker, 2006a, 2006b). In a PSA
approach, the risk of accidents is estimated by analysing all the sequences of events
that could produce an accident: the ‘causal chain’ (eg Apostolakis, 2004). At each
stage, the probability of an event’s success or failure in safety terms has to be
quantified. Statements about a ‘final ATM system’ require failure probabilities to be
estimated for its ‘human components’ – the task of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).
A PSA/HRA assessment of a final ATM system is necessarily a very complex (and no
doubt formally correct) model, but which at best would produce usable answers at some
indefinite point in the future rather than now. Much of the data required is just not there.
This is why PSA/HRA has been so heavily criticised in the nuclear power plant industry,
which is a less complex system than ATM. If somebody believes that PSA/HRA will
produce useful results, then the onus is on them to demonstrate that it actually delivers
the goods; that the precision of its answers is of known quality.
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Some DNV work illustrates the problems of PSA very clearly. As stressed already, ATM
safety analysis necessarily requires sequences and probabilities to be estimated for
failure events involving ‘human components’. It is very difficult to produce estimates of
these generally infrequent events – ie ‘tails’ of probability distributions – particularly for
errors of commission. A collection of ‘cautious’ assumptions produces over-pessimistic
– and hence not practically usable – risk estimates. To quote the DNV (2003) report:
“Using hazard analysis and associated techniques to estimate the tails has been
tried in the past with inconclusive results. The uncertainties associated with such
approaches are large and the benefits for this particular scenario relative to
extrapolating known data are unclear.”
The second reason is the nature of ‘emergent properties’, sketched in Figure 19: useful
references are Johnson (2006) and Chalmers (2006). A good – and very relevant –
example of a weak emergent property is found in mobile phone text messaging. It
started as a message service, allowing operators to inform all their own customers
about things such as problems with the network. SMS (Short Messaging Service) was
not initially meant to communicate from consumer to consumer. But Texting took off
when it found its natural markets: teenagers attracted to pre-paid phones; and when cell
phone users could send SMS to someone on a different operator. Initially, some
networks did not even charge for SMS.
An expert, defined as somebody who is very bright and genuinely knowledgeable about
a system’s workings, would be much less likely to be surprised by unexpected system
occurrences following a change than would a routine performer. But the expert could
not prove there would be no significant emergent properties when systems were
changed significantly. Human experts are not omniscient. Even the most expert
system modellers and HF experts could not guarantee that their understanding of the
final ATM system would encompass all potentially important emergent behaviours.
NextGen and SESAR are very likely to exhibit emergent properties because the
responsibilities of intelligent people in the ATM system are changed considerably and
there are new tools for them to use and adapt.
So the tasks are to:
examine each of the step-by-step phases of the progressive transition to the final
ATM system,
assuming that the changes, particularly to loosely-coupled subsystems, can be
modelled adequately,
that failure etc probabilities can be estimated for the bulk of the HF elements, and
that emergent properties in each phase can be detected somehow.
It appears that the best hope of carrying out these tasks is through ‘Human-in-the-Loop
(HITL) simulations. HITL, often called ‘real-time’ simulations, put controllers and pilots
into simulated ATC environments. A typical large-scale ATC centre HITL simulation is
essentially a mock-up of a control room, and the controllers carry out the same tasks
that they would for real traffic – in simulations the traffic data is generated by computer
and voice communications generated by the simulation’s support staff. Aircrew HITL
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simulations are usually cockpit simulators, with the most advanced kinds being able to
move the ‘aircraft’ around in an imitation of climbs, turns, etc.
There have already been significant studies into the generation of human reliability data
for ATM, eg see Gibson et al (2006), Kirwan et al (2007). These studies have shown
the feasibility of collecting human error probability data from HITL simulations. This key
data collection process could create a sound basis for HRAs of the new paradigm
phases, and help to calibrate other human error estimates obtained from other
industries (eg see ‘HEART’ generic task categories in Embrey (2004)).
But what safety calculations should be done? Trying to produce estimates of the
absolute safety level would be lengthy and probably highly unproductive. The most
straightforward – but still complex in practice – calculation would be to estimate relative
safety changes. Figure 20 shows the idea. The change to a new system, ie the next
ATM system phase, has two effects: some of the safety issues in the old system are
removed and additional safety issues are created. The difference between the two
impacts is represented in Figure 20 as a ‘Seesaw’ diagram. If the additional risks are
less than the risks that have been removed, then the implication is that it would be
acceptably safe to move to the new system. This is not actually as demanding as the
safety target ideas discussed earlier, because that additionally involves some degree of
safety improvement, although much less so than in the past because of the flatness of
the accident rate curve.
But this Seesaw approach is not likely to work every time for most of the phases
towards the final ATM system. It may not produce Go/No Go decisions. The problems
are the difficulty of making precise estimates of very small risks, and then saying with
confidence that one group of risks is less than another group. This goes right back to
the basic safety model statements: are there known types of regularities in sub-system
failures/error modes/faults etc, and can one can find data to estimate the frequency of
these regularities with some precision?
Consider a Seesaw calculation like Figure 21. The two sides of the Seesaw
approximately balance. The confidence in the estimates’ precision is low– unless the
calculations are for very simple one-parameter Collision Risk Model (CRM) changes.
Slight changes in assumptions and parameter values swing the Seesaw up or down,
shown by the angled positions of the crossbeam. The swings show the risk estimates
of the left and right hand sides varying between the upper and lower confidence bands
on the two sides. These confidence bands are shown by the vertical dumbbells against
central risk estimates. In part, the confidence bands are there because of a lack of
perfect understanding of regularities and causal factors; in part they are there because
parameters have to be built from limited quantities of data, so they necessarily have
statistical uncertainty.
If the decision-makers insist that the Seesaw is firmly down on the right hand side, ie
that the modelling of the new system guarantees that it is safer, then few of the phases
in the progression to the final system would ever be judged ‘safe’. Should decisions on
new systems simply be based on this modelling exercise? The assertion here is that
they should not: it places too rigid a test on safe innovation. So the answer is that the
Seesaw modelling test should be a filter. It should actually be about broad
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comparability: does the modelling of the new system show that it does not introduce a
significant level of extra risk?
There is a problem here: ICAO and Eurocontrol current safety regulation policies.
Andrews et al (2005) safety analysis of NextGen has already been noted, where
systems get two orders of risk reduction by taking account of the safety benefits from
TSAFE (an intent-based short-term conflict alert system) and TCAS (airborne collision
avoidance). But ICAO and Eurocontrol safety policy would consider aspects of these
calculations invalid, because currently the policy is that a system has to be ‘proven safe’
without the use of these aids. It is not obvious why such a ‘policy’ is needed, given
aviation’s tradition of rational safety testing.
There has to be a willingness to recognise the fact that STCA and TCAS are intrinsic to
the ATM system delivering its current high safety performance, rather than considering
them as little more than ‘optional extras’. Figure 22 sets out the rationale for Ground
and Air Protection layers being included in hazard analysis. Future ATM System Safety
depends crucially on both these kinds of protection. To treat them as a risk ‘bonus’ is to
prevent safe improvements to cope with increased traffic.
Returning to the general innovation process, most decision-makers would certainly want
more than this quantitative modelling filter. They would also want to know what
protection is being offered against risks arising from ‘un-thought of’ HF failure modes
and general emergent properties. There are two avenues for responding to this
concern, one prior to implementation, and the second afterwards.
HITL simulations are usually carried out to test the feasibility of a system or to
demonstrate that its normal operations are workable (eg Felder, 2006). But HITL
simulations can potentially be much more valuable in testing how resilient the system is
to errors, faults, blunders, etc; resilient meaning that the system does not become
unsafe. This mode of testing can be called seeded errors. The concept of seeded error
originates in software analysis, where automatic analytical tools are used to help in
software verification. If a potential analytical tool does not spot an error that has been
manually or randomly inserted into the software, then the reasons for the tool’s failure
need to be explored (eg Owen et al, 2006) and the system design corrected and/or the
risk potential mitigated. Realistic HITL simulations that show resilience against seeded
errors build confidence in the real system design’s resilience. [NB: Resilience
engineering is a wide field, eg see Woods et al (2006).]
The analogy here is a tank with ‘impenetrable’ armour. By impenetrable is meant that,
under battlefield conditions, the tank’s personnel do not suffer major injuries and that
the tank can keep operating. How is this proved before the tank goes into service?
First, obviously the tank’s armour must be designed in scientific and engineering ways
that render it potentially impenetrable. Second, and this is what actually sells tanks to
military customers, tanks in simulated real operations must come out operationally
unscathed from an attack by a large range of missiles and antitank weapons.
This is the kind of thing that has to be done to prove the new ATM system’s resilience.
HITL simulations must be seeded with unusual, but realistic, failure modes. But the
failure seeds necessary could be substantial: for example, if the system is not resilient
against understaffing/equipment outages, then these problems need to be solved.
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As a start, the HITL simulation needs to be seeded with key features observed in past
accidents and stressed further by increased traffic levels. For example, the Überlingen
accident involved, inter alia, staffing problems in the ATC centre and issues in the
cockpit about how to respond to TCAS alerts. The questions for the simulation include:
“Has the new system ‘designed out’ these possible failure modes? Do the
pilots/controllers react in different ways from the past – with what consequences? Are
there straightforward improvements that could be made to the new system concept?” If
the new system does not meet these challenges, it must be redesigned so that it does.
But simply re-solving past problems is not enough. The new ATM system has to prove
resilient to a wide variety of novel system challenges. Generating a sufficient variety of
novel challenges is an interesting challenge. One way of doing this is by incentivising a
group of challengers – paying them significant amounts of money for identifying
potential system weakness.
The second element in detecting ‘un-thought of’ HF failure modes and general
emergent properties is through much more rigorous monitoring than at present.
Currently, some knowledge about hazardous incidents is gathered from monitoring
systems, eg NATS’ Separation Monitoring Function detects when separation minima
have been breached. Other incident reports, such as Airproxes, rely on aircrew or
controller to initiate a report, which is then investigated. In future, if unsafe emergent
properties and new kinds of HF error are to be detected quickly, there would need to be
an increased emphasis on automatic incident detection systems. For example, if
responsibility for separation were delegated to aircrew, ie without controllers routinely
monitoring flightpaths, then it would be necessary to have cockpit systems that monitor
automatically for (eg) separation breaches and retain evidence of aircrew actions and
equipment performance leading up to the breach. A ’spy in the cab’ idea might well be
initially unattractive to aircrew. But this kind of increased operational scrutiny would be
needed: thus, pilots, controllers, managers and regulators must be active in monitoring
and inspecting real operational and organisational practices in the new system phases.
12. Key Safety Assessment and Management Messages
So what are the key messages for Safety Assessment and Management? What really
does matter? The tough challenge is to turn a new paradigm into something real.
General safety lessons are:
 Achieving and proving safety for NextGen/SESAR is an enormously tough
challenge
 Will not be done by employing current patchwork of methods focused on tightly-
coupled sub-systems
 Need rational, evidence-based and realistic modelling for Risk Assessment of the
Total ATM system
 Need to cover system resilience, human/automation issues, software/hardware
performance, ground/air protection systems
 Need to set out safety decision-making process systematically very early on
 Need for confidence building programmes re system design/resilience
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These are all very simple and obvious, but it would be essential to work through the
consequences in a disciplined fashion.
Three ideas for strategic elements are proposed, which respond inter alia to statistically
incomplete evidence. The aim is to prove each system phase safe and resilient.
Quantitative safety filter: is the estimated safety level of each new ATM system
about the same as the present ATM system? [Try to use CRMs if possible]
Does the new ATM system prove resilient in ‘Human-in-the-Loop’ simulations to
a wide variety of incentivised novel system challenges?
if unsafe emergent properties and new kinds of HF error are to be
detected/corrected quickly in operation, there needs to be increased emphasis
on automatic incident detection systems.
This is a high cost process, given the investment required in high-fidelity HITL
simulations, but probably the most cost-effective option in terms of implementing safe
ATM systems in a reasonable time. But do these strategic elements have logical flaws?
What would be the best set of statistically rational and feasible Safety Innovation
Strategies?
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andrews, J. W., Welch, J. D., and Erzberger, H. (2005). Safety Analysis for Advanced
Separation Concepts. 6th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar, Baltimore.
http://atmseminar.eurocontrol.fr/all-seminars/6th-usa-europe-atm-2005-r-d-
seminar/paper_120/attachment_download/file
Apostolakis, G. E. (2004). How Useful is Quantitative Risk Assessment? Risk Analysis,
24(3), 515-520.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes (2007). Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane
Accidents Worldwide Operations1959-2006.
http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf
Brooker, P. (2002a). Future Air Traffic Management – Passing the Key Tests.
Aeronautical Journal, 106(1058), 211-215.
Brooker, P. (2002b). Future Air Traffic Management: Quantitative En Route Safety
Assessment Part 1 – Review of Present Methods. Journal of Navigation, 55(2), 197-
211.
Brooker, P. (2002c). Future Air Traffic Management: Quantitative En Route Safety
Assessment Part 2 – New Approaches. Journal of Navigation, 55(3), 363-379.
Brooker, P. (2003a). Control Workload, Airspace Capacity and Future Systems. Human
Factors and Aerospace Safety 3(1), 1-23.
Brooker, P. (2003b). Future Air Traffic Management: Strategy and Control Philosophy.
Aeronautical Journal, 107(1076), 589-598.
Brooker, P. (2004a). Airborne separation assurance systems: towards a work
programme to prove safety. Safety Science, 42(8), 723–754.
Brooker, P. (2004b). Consistent and up-to-date aviation safety targets. Aeronautical
Journal (July), 345–356.
Brooker, P. (2004c). Why the Eurocontrol safety regulation commission policy on safety
nets and risk assessment is wrong. Journal of the Institute of Navigation, 57(2), 231–
243.
Brooker, P. (2005a). Airborne collision avoidance systems and Air Traffic Management
safety. Journal of the Institute of Navigation, 58(1), 1–16.
Brooker, P. (2005b). Reducing mid-air collision risk in controlled airspace: Lessons from
hazardous incidents. Safety Science, 43 (9), 715–738.
Brooker, P. (2005c). STCA, TCAS, Airproxes and Collision Risk. Journal of the Institute
of Navigation, 58(3), 389–404.
Brooker, P. (2006a). Air Traffic Management Accident Risk Part 1: The Limits of
Realistic Modelling. Safety Science, 44(5), 419-450.
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 28
Brooker, P. (2006b). Air Traffic Management Accident Risk. Part 2: Repairing the
Deficiencies of ESARR4. Safety Science, 44(7), 629-655.
Brooker, P. (2007a). Air Traffic Management Innovation: The Risks of Stasis. Air Traffic
Technology International 2007.
Brooker, P. (2007b). NGATS: Strategy and Challenges. Navigation News Jan/Feb, 12-
15.
Brooker, P. (2008a). SESAR and NextGen: Investing in New Paradigms. To appear in
the Journal of the Institute of Navigation.
Brooker, P. (2008b). The Überlingen Accident: Macro-Level Safety Lessons. To appear
in Safety Science.
Buchanan Jr. J. M. (1986).The Constitution of Economic Policy. Nobel Prize Lecture.
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html
Carpenter, K. (2004). ACAS Safety Study Summary. Qinetiq Report for Eurocontrol.
Available from:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/gallery/content/public/documents/Safety/ACAS%20Safet
y%20Studies.pdf
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Strong and Weak Emergence. In The Re-emergence of
Emergence. (Eds Clayton P. and Davies P.) Oxford University Press.
http://consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf
Cohn, A. (1989). The Notion of Proof in Hardware Verification. Journal of Automated
Reasoning, 5(2), 127-139.
CSTB [Computer Science and Telecommunications Board] (2007). Software for
Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence? National Academies Press. (Eds. Jackson,
D., Thomas, M. and Millett, L. I.) Pre-publication copy.
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11923
Dekker, S. W. A. (2006). Doctors Are More Dangerous Than Gun Owners: A Rejoinder
to Error Counting. Technical Report 2006-01 Lund University School of Aviation.
http://www.lusa.lu.se/upload/Trafikflyghogskolan/TR2006-
01_RejoindertoErrorCounting.pdf
DNV (2003). Safety Assessment of P-RNAV Route Spacing and Aircraft Separation.
Final Report TRS 052/01 for Eurocontrol.
Dougherty, E. M. (1990). Human reliability analysis – where shouldst thou turn?
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 29, 283-299.
EC [European Commission] (2007). State of progress with the project to implement the
new generation European air traffic management system (SESAR) 2nd March 2007.
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/sesame/doc/0315_comm_sesar_en.pdf
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 29
Embrey, D. (2004). Qualitative and quantitative evaluation of human error in risk
assessment. In Human Factors for Engineers. (Eds. Sandom, C. and Harvey, R. S.)
IEE.
Eurocontrol (2006). Understanding Safety Culture in Air Traffic Management. Safety
Domain, DAP/SAF.
http://www.eurocontrol.int/safesky/gallery/content/public/SafetyDomainSept06.pdf
Evans, A. W. (2005). Safety Appraisal Criteria. The Royal Academy of Engineering and
Lloyd’s Register Lecture on Risk Management.
FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] (2003). Collision Avoidance Systems; Final Rule.
Department of Transportation Part III 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, and 129. Available from:
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003
/pdf/03-7653.pdf
Felder, W. N. (2006). Next Generation Air Transportation System Demonstration
Program. ATCA Journal of Air Traffic Control. January-March.
http://www.jpdo.gov/library/ngats_demonstration_program.pdf
Gibson, W. H., Hickling, B. and Kirwan, B. (2006). Feasibility Study into the Collection of
Human Error Probability Data. Eurocontrol Experimental Centre EEC Note No. 02/06.
http://www.eurocontrol.be/eec/gallery/content/public/documents/EEC_notes/2006/EEC_
note_2006_02.pdf
Hoare, C. A. R. (1996). “The Role of Formal Techniques: Past, Current and Future or
How Did Software Get so Reliable without Proof?” Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE '96), IEEE.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D., and Leveson, N. (Eds) (2006). Resilience Engineering:
Concepts And Precepts. Ashgate Publishing
Johnson, C. W. (2006). What are Emergent Properties and How do They Affect the
Engineering of Complex Systems? Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 91(12),
1475-1481. http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/emergence.pdf
JPDO [Joint Planning and Development Office] (2007). Concept of Operations for the
Next Generation Air Transportation System. Draft 5, 28th February, 2007, Version 1.2.
Available from http://techhangar.jpdo.aero/
Kirwan, B., Hickling, B. Perrin, E., Gibson, W. H., Smith, E. (2007). , Generation of
Human Reliability Data for the Air Traffic Industry. Eurocontrol Experimental Centre
EEC-2006-071.
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eec/gallery/content/public/documents/EEC_safety_document
s/PSAM8_0030_paper.doc
Littlewood, B. and Strigini, L. (1993). Validation of Ultra-High Dependability for
Software-based Systems Communications of the ACM, 36(11): 69-80.
MacKenzie, D. (1991). The Fangs of the VIPER. Nature, 352, 8 August, pg. 467-468.
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 30
Marais, K. and Weigel, A. L. (2006). Encouraging and Ensuring Successful Technology
Transition in Civil Aviation. MIT ESD-WP-2006-07. http://esd.mit.edu/wps/esd-wp-2006-
07.pdf
Marais, K., Dulac, N., Leveson, N., (2004). Beyond normal accidents and high reliability
organizations: The need for an alternative approach to safety in complex systems. In:
Engineering Systems Division Symposium. MIT, Cambridge, MA.
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/hro.pdf.
McDermid, J. and Kelly, T. (2006). "Software in Safety Critical Systems: Achievement
and Prediction", Nuclear Future, 2(3), 140-145.
ftp://ftp.cs.york.ac.uk/pub/hise/Software_in_Safety_Critical_Systems:Achievement_and
_Prediction.pdf
MIT (2007). The Story of Mode S: An Air Traffic Control Data Link Technology.
http://mit.edu/6.933/www/Fall2000/mode-s/collisions.html# 1986# 1986
Moray, N. (1990). Dougherty’s Dilemma and the One-sidedness of Human Reliability
Analysis Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 29, 337-344.
Owen, D., Desovski, D., Cukic, B. (2006). Effectively Combining Software Verification
Strategies: Understanding Different Assumptions. 17th International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering, ISSRE 2006, 321-330.
http://www.csee.wvu.edu/~dowen/papers/issre06.pdf
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books,
New York.
Reich, P. G. (1966). Analysis of long-range air traffic systems: separation standards.
Journal of Navigation, 19, 88–98, 169–193 and 331–347.
Reuters UK (2007). Tennis-Match statistics for Federer v Nadal. July 8th.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/tennisNews/idUKL0840015820070708
SESAR Consortium (2007). The ATM Target Concept. DLM-0612-001-02-00. SESAR
Definition Phase, Deliverable 3. 27th September 2007.
http://www.eurocontrol.int/sesar/gallery/content/public/docs/DLM-0612-001-02-00.pdf
Sheridan, T. B. (2006). Next Generation Air Transportation System: Human- Automation
Interaction and Organizational Risks. Resilience Engineering Symposium, Juan les
Pins, France, November 8-10, 2006. http://www.resilience-
engineering.org/REPapers/Sheridan_R.pdf
Sheridan, T. B., Corker, K. and Nadler, E. (2006). Report on a Workshop on Human-
Automation Interaction in NGATS. DOT-VNTSC-NASA-06-02.
http://www.volpe.dot.gov/hf/docs/worshop-hai-sheridan.doc
Sorensen, J. N. (2002). Safety culture: a survey of the state-of-the-art. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety, 76(2), 189-204.
SwissInfo (2007). Four Skyguide employees found guilty. September 4th, 2007, 9:58
PM. http://www.swissinfo.org/eng/swissinfo.html?siteSect=881&sid=8170439
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 31
Thomas, M. (2004). Engineering Judgement. 9th Australian Workshop on Safety
Related Programmable Systems (SCS’04). Brisbane. Conferences in Research and
Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 47 (Cant, T., Ed.).
http://crpit.com/confpapers/CRPITV47Thomas.pdf
Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely-coupled systems.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(1), 1–19.
Williamson, T. and Spencer, N. A. (1989). Development and Operation of the Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Proceedings of the IEEE, 77(11) 1735-
1744.
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 32
Controllers and pilots – people are an integral part of the whole
system
Formal Rules for the control of traffic, eg minimum separations
allowed between aircraft
Radio Telephony
Controlled Airspace – broken down into sectors handled by
controller teams
Flight Progress Information – flight plan computing
Radar – processed SSR: displayed aircraft symbols, callsign and
height information, passed down from aircraft transponders
Computer Processing of radar and flight data.
High Quality Aircraft Navigation – Point source beacons to INS
[Inertial Navigation Systems] through to satellite-based aids
Conflict Alert (STCA) – the computer processing system can
analyse SSR tracks to predict if aircraft might come into close
proximity and warn the controller by radar screen messages
Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System TCAS – on board collision
avoidance system based on detection of other aircraft in the vicinity
carrying SSR transponders
Figure 1. The Current System’s Evolved Safety Defences
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Figure 2. Worldwide Airline Fatalities 1947-2006. Taken from Airline Safety Network
Statistics, http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/period/
Mode Fatalities per
billion Passenger
km
Air 0.00
Water 0.3
Bus/coach 0.3
Rail 0.4
Car 2.8
Table 1. Passenger fatality rates by mode in Great Britain 1995-2004 Average. (Source:
Department for Transport ‘Road Casualties 2005 Great Britain’, 2006)
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Figure 3. Possible Phases for a Rational Decision Process
Safe Route Design
Formal Safety
RulesControlled Airspace
Technical Infrastructure
Radio Telephony
Radar
High Quality Aircraft
NavigationComputer Processing
Flight Progress Strips
Planning Controller
Flying Pilot
Controlling Controller
Ground Protection
STCA
Controller and Pilot
Air Protection
TCAS
Pilot
Figure 4. ATM Safety System Layers
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Do further work
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Modelling
Do further work
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What is the acceptable risk?
 X (the Safety Target)
 measurement + value judgement
What would be (sic) the actual risk?
 Y (the estimated risk)
 modelling + prediction +validation
If Y ≤ X then decision is ‘go ahead’
Figure 5. ATM Decisions – Safety Target Philosophy
Fatal
aircraft
accidents
per 107
aircraft
flying
hours
Year
Fitted
trend
line
Figure 6. Fatal aircraft accident rate data and trend – illustrative
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Figure 7. Risk Budget – simple phases of flight
Figure 8. Risk budgets down to separation minima TLS (continuing Figure 7 down to the
next level)
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Figure 9. Short Term Conflict Alert - STCA
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Figure 10. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System - TCAS
Own aircraft
Intruder
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Figure 11. Aspects of Control Workload
Figure 12. Control Workload Problem
TASKLOAD (eg)
Monitoring
Communication
System manipulation
Data analysis
Decision making
Computer
Radar
Traffic data
Data filtering
Voice
Text
Voice
Text
System
outputs
Time
Pressure
Performance
Standards
Physiological
Symptoms
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Increased Traffic Free Routeing
 
Increased Control workload -
BUT MUST ENSURE SAFETY
Datalink to reduce Communication Tasks?
Computer Assistance & better Ergonomics?
Transfer some tasks to Pilots?
More Controllers?
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Figure 13. Airprox ‘Causes’
[From a sample of 117 recent UK Airproxes (mid-2003 to mid-2006) involving
commercial flights. Eliminated: Airproxes in ‘uncontrolled’ airspace (Class F/G), military
zones, North Sea; military aircraft, parachutist, balloons, sighting reports.]
 1st July 2002
 Flights Bergamo to Brussels and Munich to Barcelona
 B757 and Tupolev-154
 Aircraft on converging course at flight level 36,000 feet
 Air traffic control + STCA + TCAS did not resolve the conflict
 The aircraft crashed
 All the people on the aircraft died
How? Why?
 Managers/Regulator allowed (?) just one controller working the radar screen
 Controller monitored two different display workstations
 Controller became preoccupied handling the approach of an aircraft to an
airport
 Controller did not realise phone system was not functioning
 Regulatory system did not ensure that pilots would respond to TCAS alerts
consistently
Controller murdered
Four Swiss ATC managers found guilty of manslaughter
Figure 14 Überlingen Mid-Air Collision: Facts and some human elements
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Figure 1. NGATS components
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Figure 15. NextGen
 User-selected flexible 4D trajectories from gate-to-gate
 Agreed-upon trajectory contracts flown with approved
variances
 Variances in flightpaths managed by exception
 Seamless airspace across current or projected boundaries,
so no need to distinguish between airports/terminal area/en
route airspaces/boundaries
 Network centric system-wide perspective with information
shared by all users: datalink – ie text-messaging between all
parties – is vital
Figure 16. NextGen Operating Concept
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 Operations based on better forecasting
Change from reactive ATM to anticipatory ATM – to reduce operational
pressure on human operators
 Better anticipation of problems
Collaborative decision-making procedures – stakeholders share and
negotiate relevant information
Merge the different "trajectory" representations into a single one
established by the on-board computers
Accurate monitoring of the scheduled ‘trajectory’ by means of extremely
accurate satellite navigation
 Efficient telecommunications network
Network of ground-to-air data links to enable accurate 'trajectory"
information exchanges
All stakeholders to have effective and simultaneous access to flight
information status
 Optimisation of the use of airports
‘Smooth’ approaches to reduce noise and gaseous emissions during
landing
Better forecasting and detection of turbulence phenomena
 Increased automation of air traffic control tools to assist operators
Share workload between the air traffic controller on the ground and the
pilot
Trajectory negotiation planning and support tools
Cockpit tools to visualise surrounding traffic
Figure 17. Some SESAR Features (extracted from EC, 2007) [excludes weather,
security elements]
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE
2nd IET SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE 43
Figure 18. ‘Rational – but Sick’ Decision process
An Emergent property of a complex system is a
behaviour that surprises its designers
Strong emergent properties occur if the system
exhibits behaviours that cannot be identified
through functional decomposition – the system is
more than the sum of its component parts.
Weak emergence properties are unexpected simply
because of the degree of difficulty that the designer
has in deducing them from his/her understanding
of the component parts (Compare ‘Interactive
complexity’ concept for system coupling)
Figure 19. Emergent properties
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Figure 20. Classical Seesaw safety calculation
Figure 21 ‘Confidence band’ Seesaw safety calculation
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 All systematically applied safety defences should be considered
as full parts of the integrated ATM safety system
 This includes STCA and TCAS
 Hazard analysis calculations incorporating STCA and TCAS
provide a measure of the true risk potential in the real world
 Excluding them puts an extra burden on risk estimation: the
calculations will tend to be even more cautious – and hence
more pessimistic about the value of new concepts
 This is backward-looking: it retards the introduction of
acceptably safe systems embodying novel operational concepts –
it has become more difficult to prove their safety
Figure 22. The rationale for Ground and Air Protection layers being included in
hazard analysis.
